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Article 3

JURIDICAL PERSONALITY AND INTIMACY
Michael McAuley*
You will take him in your arms, embrace and caress him the
way a man caresses his wife. He will be your double, your
second self, a man who is loyal, who will stand at your side
through the greatest dangers. Soon you will meet him, the
companion of your heart.
Gilgamesh†
I. Introduction: Persons and Personality ....................................... 24
II. Juridical Personality and Intimacy ........................................... 32
III. Attributes of Juridical Personality .......................................... 39
IV. Sources of Intimacy ................................................................ 46
V. Intimate Associations ............................................................... 52
VI. Conclusion .............................................................................. 55
* Michael McAuley is an advocate and practices in Montreal. This paper
wants to be adventurous and unorthodox. All law sources, formal and informal,
are treated on a horizontal plane. All non-law sources are treated as having legal
value. This paper does not specify a particular time or place although it has been
written for the traditions and systems of the West. It also endeavours to reinforce
the idea that any discussion of a legal conception necessarily involves some
definition of law, as well as some agreement on how the word law is used and
what notions it embraces. This paper has been designed to be accessible to a
wide range of educated citizens. Accordingly, with a view to promoting efficient
reading, all material that does not add to the argument is relegated to the
footnotes.
†
See GILGAMESH 83-84 (Stephen Mitchell trans., Free Press, New York,
2004). The earliest surviving texts relating legends of Gilgamesh date from 2100
BCE. Id. at 3. The Standard Version of the Epic of Gilgamesh dates from about
1200 BCE. Id. at 6. The story of Gilgamesh is his relationship with Enkidu with
whom Gilgamesh has a homoerotic and, perhaps, homosexual bond. Id. at 13.
Yet, his physical bond, as this text indicates, nourishes fides–the fidelity of a
loyal and intimate companion. The battle of these heroes is ―an entrance into
intimacy, and as close to lovemaking as to violence.‖ Id. at 23.
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I. INTRODUCTION: PERSONS AND PERSONALITY
It is best to begin boldly.
What is the law? Is it nothing more than a particular system of
principles, rules, and standards, enacted by a constituted authority,
that govern people at a particular time and in a particular place? On
Main Street, people may think of the law as such, as a set of
sovereign pronouncements without ethical direction. Or, like many
private-law practitioners, they may think of the law as a random
scheme of rules of allocative efficiency and maximization of
wealth.
Thoughtful citizens, however, know that the law‘s empire is
more than a grouping of prescriptions and sanctions. Throughout
the ages, they have talked about the law as a complex of truthful
ideas and moral propositions of ways to regulate the conduct of
people in society amongst themselves, in their relations to things,
and in their dealings with the sovereign. Thus, it is only in a highly
limited, indeed unnatural, sense that the law, as a topic and as a
system of rules, can be said to be purely positivistic1 and valuefree.2

1.
Positivism is popularly perceived both as a denial that equity, justice
and reason form part of an imperative ius commune and as an assertion that there
are no supereminent principles to which legislation must confirm. Yet,
positivism does admit that there may be some moral and ethical content to law
or, at the very least, that positive laws make moral norms effective. See Brian H.
Bix, Natural Law: The Modern Tradition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 60, 95-98 (Jules Coleman & Scott
Shapiro eds., Oxford University Press, 2002) (summarizing the modern tradition
of the natural law theory and its relation to positivism). As Bix notes, the
positive law school has two major approaches (inclusivism and exclusivism) to
the treatment of moral and ethical matters. Id. at 7-8. Even where it is admitted
that law may have some moral and ethical content, positivism, at first blush,
would seem open to a plurality of moral and ethical standards or at least open to
as many such standards as there are systems. Can many moralities be compared?
For an assessment of positivism within the context of comparative law, see
Catherine Valcke, Comparative Law as Comparative Jurisprudence–The
Comparability of Legal Systems, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 713, 724-731 (arguing that
positivism, by reason of the plurality of approaches, does not allow for
comparison of legal systems).
2.
Finnis has an appealing definition of law that refers to both enacted
rules but also to un-enacted, community-regulating norms that are not (or have
not yet been) recognized by the constituted authority. Although the thrust of his
definition seems highly positivistic, the reference to the ―common good‖ as the
telos of the law is the definition‘s focus and is, of course, the definition‘s
contentious core. See generally JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHTS 276-281 (Oxford University Press, 2000). His definition is:
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As it happens, earnest debate on the nature of the law gives
every indication that the law is ethically ambitious and that it
aspires, in very practical ways, to put in place love-based3 rules for
good social order. Good law does not adopt single-value
approaches. It harkens for a healthy relativism attuned to the
community. It accepts the pluralism of moral values, and it
acknowledges that the source of these values is likely both secular
and theological.4 Thus, good law is polycentric, facilitative, and
responsive to personal autonomy.5
[The law] refer[s] primarily to rules made, in accordance with
regulative legal rules, by a determinate and effective authority
(itself identified and, standardly, constituted as an institution by
legal rules) for a ‗complete‘ community, and buttressed by
sanctions in accordance with the rule-guided stipulations of
adjudicative institutions, this ensemble of rules and institutions
being directed to reasonably resolving any of the community‘s coordination problems (and to ratifying, tolerating, regulating, or
overriding co-ordination solutions from any other institutions or
sources of norms) for the common good of that community,
according to a manner and form itself adapted to that common
good by features of specificity, minimization of arbitrariness, and
maintenance of a quality of reciprocity between the subjects of the
law both amongst themselves and in their relations with the lawful
authorities.
Id. at 276-277.
3.
See HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION
OF LAW AND RELIGION 313-318 (1993). ―I would contend that law, understood
in a Christian perspective, is a process of creating conditions in which sacrificial
love, the kind of love personified by Jesus Christ, can take root in society and
grow.‖ Id. at 313. Sacrificial love is agape. Again, from a Christian viewpoint, it
is by loving our fellow men and women that we know God. To love is to
cooperate.
4.
See generally George P. Fletcher, What Law is Like, 50 S.M.U.L.
REV. 1599, 1610-1612 (1997). ―The law is more like religion than the
practitioners of either are likely to recognize.‖ Id.at 1611. ―But lawyers and
theologians share a pursuit of ultimate truth in the context of culture-specific
traditions. They must mediate between the demands of universal reason and
their localized respect for particular sources.‖ Id. ―Because their authorities are
not always moral, both law and religion end up endorsing views that sensitive
free-thinkers find abhorrent.‖ Id.
5.
Polycentricity looks at legal relationships as relationships between
the normative orders of a particular society. It seeks the recognition of these
relationships within the legal system of that society. See generally SURYA
PRAKASH SINHA, LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY 1-17 (1996). Legal polycentricity
accepts the pluralism of moral values. Id. at 6. It does not accept that ―. . .
conflicting values are reconcilable under one truth.‖ Id. at 3. Legal
polycentricity ―provides facilities to persons for realizing their particular
objectives.‖ Id. at 13. It accommodates personal autonomy. Id. The Law Reform
Commission of New Zealand acknowledges law‘s facilitative function. See
generally The Law Reform Commission of New Zealand, Recognising Same–Sex
Relationships, Study Paper 4 (Dec. 1999). ―The history of mankind
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So, the law in motion endeavors to bring about the common
and actually6 moral good, as this good is tentatively and modestly
understood and experienced in today‘s context. In this regard, the
law is meekly cognizant of its own forward-looking—indeed, one
might say—its own eschatological dimensions.7
One of the subject matters of the law is personhood.
―[A]person in law is one who can play a part in the life of the
law.‖8 The law asks: who is a person, and what is her condition? It
addresses this question by considering the essential qualities of a
demonstrates that one of the ways in which human sexuality manifests itself is
in the formation of publicly avowed and socially recognised relationships
intended to be enduring. The legal code of a state properly responsive to the
aspirations of its citizens will make provision for such relationships be they
heterosexual or homosexual.‖ Id. at 9.
6.
―Actually‖ means a ―good‖ rooted in actual persons‘ desires and
experiences. See Steven D. Smith, Natural Law and Contemporary Moral
Thought: A Guide from the Perplexed, 42 AM J. JURIS. 299, 316-330 (1997)
(book review) (questioning the value of the ―objective‖ account of sexual
morality, and advocating a discourse of ―good‖ where ―good‖ is personal and
subjective in some important sense). ―[T]he natural lawyer severs goods from
our language and understanding, in which things are ―good‖ to and for persons
and as experienced by persons . . . To put the point differently, our moral
discourse is conducted by us, for better or worse, for our purposes and subject to
our understandings.‖ Id. at 320.
7.
See Michael McAuley, The Gay Man and His Civil Code, 64 LA. L.
REV. 443, 449 (2004) (stating that culturally constructed identities will not
survive the grave and that the eschatological vocation of a good civil code means
that people must learn to live with each other here and today). See also GARETH
MOORE OP, THE BODY IN CONTEXT–SEX AND CATHOLICISM 2-3 (Continuum,
London, 2001) (1992). ―To be fit to live in the kingdom is to live with others in a
particular way or range of ways. If a Christian ethic may be seen as
eschatological, it is also social. It is about learning to be with each other.‖ Id. at
3. On the relationship of eschatology and ethics, and on ―action for the world‘s
betterment,‖ see Kathryn Tanner, Eschatology and Ethics, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THEOLOGICAL ETHICS 41, 52-56 (Gilbert Meilaender & William
Werpehowski eds., Oxford, 2005). See also Margaret A. Farley, New Patterns of
Relationship: Beginnings of a Moral Revolution, 36 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 627
(1975).
If the ultimate normative model for relationships between persons
is the very life of the Trinitarian God, then a strong eschatological
ethic suggests itself as a context for Christian justice. That is to
say, interpersonal communion characterized by equality,
mutuality, and reciprocity may serve not only as a norm against
which every pattern of relationship may be measured but as a goal
to which every pattern of relationship is ordered.
Id. at 645-646. It should be noted that Farley‘s observations focus on malefemale relationships.
8.
H., J., AND L. MAZEAUD, LEÇONS DE DROIT CIVIL, t. 1, v. 2, no. 438
(trans.) (7th ed., Montchrestien, Paris, 1986), cited in QUEBEC CIVIL LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION TO QUEBEC PRIVATE LAW 203 (John E.C. Brierley and Roderick
A. Macdonald, eds., Emond Montgomery, Toronto, 1993).
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person under a topic called personality. When talking about
personality, the law calls persons actors or subjects and says that
they must be free in order to have full personality since the law has
had, at times, relatively developed notions of deprivation or
absence of personality.9
Each citizen is one-of-one, but each is also one-of-many since
all citizens belong to political, social and economic communities.
In one sense, a person is a citizen because she belongs to one of
these communities, and her rights and duties are specified by that
community. In another sense, her citizenship is coextensive with
her personhood and extends beyond national boundaries. Her
citizenship reflects her participation in communities and her
implication in their life.
In these communities, citizens are called to cooperate with each
other.10 The nature and scope of the right-owning and duty-owing
attributes of a citizen‘s personality are determined on the basis of
her status (or statuses) in these communities. Across the board,
family status largely determines a person‘s capacity to enjoy and
exercise rights in the society where she lives.
In civil society,11 in contemporary12 private law,13 and in the
West,14 the family is the benchmark that indicates people‘s
9.
At times, the attributes of personality have not been extended to noncitizens, outlaws, the imprisoned, and the enslaved. Personality has also been
interested in human physiology. For example, in Roman law and in the ancien
droit of France, monstres (monsters, in the sense of deformed neonates) had no
personality. See AUBRY & RAU, 1 DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 363 n.10 (7th ed.,
André Ponsard ed., Paris, 1964).
10.
In the context of property law, see JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE
EDGES OF THE FIELD-LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF OWNERSHIP 20-25
(Beacon Press, Boston, 2000). ―Rights must be limited to protect rights. This
paradox arises because we do not live alone. The law–including the law of
property – recognizes that our fate is tied to the fate of others. Moreover, the law
does not exist only to protect our interests; it exists also to promote liberty and
justice. These goals cannot be realized unless we act in ways that respect the
interests of others.‖ Id. at 20.
11.
Civil society is a society governed by civil law–ius civile. In this
sense, the civil law means the secular law applicable to citizens of a particular
place that regulates their public and private lives and that accords to them certain
civil rights and freedoms. On the history of the meaning of civil law, see
generally Alain Sériaux, Droit civil, in DICTIONNAIRE DE LA CULTURE
JURIDIQUE 435 (Denis Alland & Stéphane Rials eds., Presses universitaires de
France, Paris, 2003).
12.
Roland Barthes asks: ―De qui suis-je le contemporain? Avec qui estce que je vis ?‖ (Who is my contemporary? With whom do I live?). See ROLAND
BARTHES, COMMENT VIVRE ENSEMBLE–NOTES DE COURS ET DE SEMINAIRES AU
COLLEGE DE FRANCE, 1976–1977 36 (Éditions du Seuil 2002). Barthes states
that contemporaneousness is a very complex and little examined topic. Id.
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personal status, and the rights and duties related to that status.
Accordingly, personality usually is discussed in a traditional
family context,15 dominated by the metanarrative of marriage16 as
13.
Private law is the ensemble of legal rules governing relations among
persons and, sometimes, between individuals and public bodies. Private law
usually encompasses civil law, commercial law and, perhaps, judicial law. See
the entry for ―private law‖ in PRIVATE LAW DICTIONARY AND BILINGUAL
LEXICONS 339 (2d ed., Les Éditions Yvon Blais, Cowansville, 1991). See also
Introduction, in 1 ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW XXXVI (Peter Birks ed., Oxford
University Press, 2000). ―The whole of the law is either public law or private
law. There is no need to pause on this, nor to investigate the boundary disputes.
Our present business is only with private law. English Public Law will deal with
the other side. It will deal with constitutional law, human rights, administrative
law, and criminal law.‖ Id. English Public Law seems to take the position that
the sources of fundamental rights are found either in constitutional documents,
statutes or case-law. In the absence of a written constitution, as is the case for
England, judges have exclusive control over the sources for legal justifications.
See Evelyn Ellis, Constitutional Fundamentals: Sources of Law and the
Hierarchy of Norms, in ENGLISH PUBLIC LAW 3, 44-45 (David Feldman ed.,
Oxford University Press, 2004). Quaere, where do judges find their sources?
From a certain perspective, the British inability to protect fundamental rights
(owing to the absence of written constitutional documents) has been somewhat
mitigated by the Human Rights Act 1998. Under the terms of this Act, specified
rights were adopted into municipal law. Presumably on account of the
parliamentary adoption of certain provisions of the European Convention, Ellis‘
co-contributor and the volume‘s general editor, David Feldman, deals with the
topic of privacy, lifestyle, personal integrity, status, gender, sexuality, and family
life solely under the Convention and the Act. See David Feldman, Rights to Life,
Physical and Moral Integrity, Freedom of Lifestyle and Religion or Belief, in
ENGLISH PUBLIC LAW, supra at 471-479. Feldman does not discuss the topic of
the origin of the rights or the notion that human rights might be innate in the
persona (personhood) of the human person (and not conferred by the sovereign
or otherwise formally justified).
14.
Where is the West? It is a hemisphere. It indicates a direction on a
compass, but also a metaphorical direction: ―Go West, young man.‖ However,
the West, in the law, might be taken to mean all those traditions and systems that
have a like approach to issues and that have a common mentalité (mental, or
intellectual, disposition) characterized by their attention to personalism
(individual freedom and social duty), legalism (the need to base decisions on a
general rule of law), and intellectualism (conceptual and systematic legal
methodology). See Franz Wieacker, Foundations of European Legal Culture, 38
AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 19-27 (1990). See also BERMAN, supra note 3 at 23-33
(describing the characteristic elements of the Western legal tradition). On
modern perspectives of the nature of a legal tradition, see Ugo Mattei & Anna di
Robilant, The Art and Science of Critical Scholarship: Postmodernism and
International Style in the Legal Architecture of Europe, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1053,
1071-1077 (2004). ―Membership in one legal tradition is not exclusive, because
tradition is not an ontological entity; rather, it is an interpretive entity largely
defined by a sense of belonging and identity.‖ Id. at 1072.
15.
―Tradition‖ and ―traditional‖ are unsafe words, especially in the
domain of intimate personal relationships. One might sensibly propose the
following definition. ―Tradition‖ is a complex of customs and practices handed
down from one living generation to another living generation, the elements of
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related by its mythweavers.17 This is so notwithstanding modern
disestablishment of the conventional marriage model.18
The personality in the law, or juridical personality, of the
human person is a personality of a person who has human selfconsciousness, self-identity, and center of reference.19 It deals with
which can be found in the actual experience of a living generation or the accurate
memory of a living generation of the historically verified experience of a former
generation or generations. Can ―tradition‖ mean anything more than this?
Today‘s lawmakers and popular media use ―traditional marriage‖ in the sense of
marriage as experienced everywhere since the beginning of time and, of course,
as linked to the ―intelligent design‖ of human existence. The tedious and mantric
repetition of ―traditional marriage‖ (and its imagined, immemorial incidents and
effects) constitutes not only a mistaken reality but a clearly invented tradition.
On the nature of an invented tradition, see generally Eric Hobsbawm,
Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in THE INVENTION OF TRADITION 1-14 (Eric
Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., Cambridge University Press, 1983).
Hobsbawm states:
‗Invented tradition‘ is taken to mean a set of practices, normally
governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or
symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms
of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity
with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to
establish continuity with a suitable historic past.
Id. at 1.
It is the contrast between the constant change and innovation of
the modern world and the attempt to structure at least some parts
of social life within it as unchanging and invariant, that makes the
‗invention of tradition‘ so interesting for historians of the past two
centuries.
Id. at 2.
16.
Fineman discusses social and cultural ―narratives‖ about the family
and marriage as an institution. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY
TRAGEDIES 145-176 (1995).
17.
For the word ―mythweaver‖, see IF NOT, WINTER–FRAGMENTS OF
SAPPHO 353, 382 (Ann Carson trans. 2002).
18. Cott summarizes various reasons for the disestablishment,
dejuridification, delegalization, and privitization of marriage in the United
States. See generally, Nancy F. Cott, PUBLIC VOWS-A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE
AND THE NATION 200-227 (2000). For the use of disestablishment and its
synonyms, see id. at 283, n.17. Most of the reasons are economic. They include:
two-earner families; households of unrelated groups; cohabiting couples; more
than one generation living together; single-person households; single mothers
and fathers; transgressive (italics added) sexuality; and enforcement of support
obligations outside of the marital bond. Id. at 214-215. When Cott uses the word
―transgressive,‖ does she mean sinful sexuality or sexuality not conformable
with certain societal expectations?
19.
See GERALD O‘COLLINS, S.J., CHRISTOLOGY–A BIBLICAL,
HISTORICAL, AND SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF JESUS 224-249 (Oxford University
Press, 1995) (discussing the divine and human natures of Christ). ―The ego of his
human consciousness is also the Word of God as humanly conscious and selfconscious, that is, as operating in and through this human awareness. God the
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her existence, her voluntary action, and her rights and
obligations.20 It is the free action of the citizen and her free access
to legal institutions. Juridical personality is also her free enjoyment
and exercise of civil rights, and her freely assumed obligation to
undertake and discharge her civil duties. She has a patrimony21
and, in the private law, rights and duties relate either to her
patrimonial assets and debts or to her extrapatrimonial rights (and
concomitant duties) to the respect of her personal dignity, integrity
and privacy, as well as to the respect of her other civil rights and
fundamental freedoms.22 In public law she also has a patrimonial
stake in property that belongs to the community whether local,
regional or international. She and all others are stakeholders and
are entrusted to preserve and safeguard the common patrimony for
transmission from generation unto generation.23
Son takes as his own this human self-consciousness, self-identity, and centre of
reference.‖ Id. at 247.
20.
The law is interested in a person‘s existence, identity (name,
domicile or residence, civil and family status, and sex), and her attributes
(subjective rights). See generally JEAN CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 1: LES
PERSONNES 15, 19-177 (21st ed., Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2000).
The objective law attributes subjective rights. Id. at 15. Modern French
scholarship still adheres to a formal definition of law. Law is a series of
prescriptive rules for social conduct that are sanctioned by a public authority.
The French carefully distinguish legal and moral rules: their objectives are
different. See generally JEAN-LOUIS BERGEL, THEORIE GENERALE DU DROIT 4252 (4th ed., Dalloz, Paris, 2003).
21.
A patrimony is the aggregate of a person‘s rights and obligations
determined or determinable in economic or pecuniary terms. ―Extrapatrimonial‖
primarily refers to rights that are ―out of commerce‖ and have no monetary
value. See generally the entries for ―patrimony‖, ―extrapatrimonial‖, and
―extrapatrimonial right‖, supra note 13, PRIVATE LAW DICTIONARY AND
BILINGUAL LEXICONS at 157, 311-312. A breach of an extrapatrimonial right has
patrimonial implications.
22.
―Civil rights,‖ ―civil freedoms,‖ ―fundamental freedoms,‖ ―civil
liberties‖ and other terms of like ilk are often used interchangeably. As used in
this paper, ―civil rights‖ refers to those ―rights‖ recognized explicitly or
implicitly by the private law, and ―fundamental freedoms‖ to those ―rights‖
formally or informally present in the public law and, in particular, in the
constitutions, written or unwritten, of sovereign bodies. Of course, there is
considerable travel between the private and public spheres of the law, and it is
often difficult to determine whether the private law or the public law first
recognized any particular right. For a short, readable account of the various
senses of ―rights‖, see MAURICE CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? 19-24
(The Bodley Head, London, 1973).
23. The notion of ―patrimoine commun‖ (common patrimony) is
particularly useful in connection with environmental protection issues. See
generally Marie-José Del Rey, La notion controversée de patrimoine commun,
D. 2006, No. 6, 388. As a juridical conception, the idea of common patrimony
promotes awareness that every individual is a stakeholder. Id. at 389. Although
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This paper examines intimate association, under the rubric of
intimacy, as the actual, aspiringly good experience of people in the
law. In this paper, intimate association is unmoored from legal
abstractions of an ideal or canonically imagined society of robotic
citizens and released from any pre-existing or pre-conceived
morality that militates in favor of a single form of intimate
association. It is transsystemic24 and cross-disciplinary in that it is
interested in the best approach to intimacy in Western legal
traditions and systems25 and in the social sciences. The best
approach is supranational and is fashioned from a ius commune
that is a ―shared international fund of private law [thinking].‖26
Accordingly, this paper first discusses the relationship between
juridical personality and intimacy. It then sets out to identify the
contours of juridical personality and further define its attributes.
Third, it looks at the right of intimacy, considered as an attribute of

touted as a novel conception in civil law scholarship, its notions are similar to
those that have long been known to underscore the chthonic legal tradition. See
generally H.P. GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD–SUSTAINABLE
DIVERSITY IN THE LAW 59-91 (2d ed., Oxford University Press, 2005).
24.
On the meaning of the word ―transsystemic‖ as a way of knowing
the law, see generally Nicholas Kasirer, Bijuralism in Law‟s Empire and in
Law‟s Cosmos, 52 J. LEG. EDUC. 29 (2002).
25.
The notion of a legal system is roughly understood as an
interconnected and interrelated body of institutions, rules and norms that
formally or informally govern society in a particular place. A University of
London student subject guide nicely describes a legal system as ―a complex of
operations, processes, human actions, institutions and ideals.‖ See WAYNE
MORRISON ET AL., COMMON LAW REASONING AND INSTITUTIONS 26
(Publications Office, The External Programme, University of London 2004). A
legal tradition has been well defined by Merryman. See John Henry Merryman,
The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western
Europe and Latin America 1-4, in THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN
AMERICAN, AND EAST ASIA-CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (John Henry Merryman et
al. eds., The Michie Company, Charlottesville, 1994, 2000 repr.).
[A legal tradition] is a set of deeply rooted, historically
conditioned attitudes about the nature of the law, about the role of
law in society and the polity, about the proper organization and
operation of a legal system, and about the way law is or should be
made, applied, studied, perfected, and taught.
Id. at 3-4.
26.
See FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE
JUSTICE 193 (Martinus Nijhoof Publishers, The Netherlands, 1993). Juenger
proposes a new methodological pluralism for the resolution of choice-of-law
issues in American conflicts law. Id. at 191-194. For the use of the word ―best‖
and for a methodological approach similar to Juenger‘s proposal, see generally
L. McDougall III, Toward Application of the Best Rule of Law in Choice of Law
Cases, 35 MERCER L. REV. 483 (1984) (advocating that courts should apply the
best rule of law in choice-of-law cases).
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juridical personality and as a private-law right of intimate
association. It endeavors to locate the formal and informal sources
of intimacy in close, personal relationships. The paper next tries to
specify intimate associations. By way of conclusion, it restates the
nature of juridical personality and its intimate components.
II. JURIDICAL PERSONALITY AND INTIMACY
Juridical personality recognizes that the citizen has important
rights of intimacy in her life and at home. These rights include the
right of intimacy, expressed as a right at large, and particular rights
of intimacy. Particular rights, for example, relate to the protection
of her physical and intellectual intimacy, the intimacy of her
appearance, image and reputation, the protection of her intimate
private life against undue public scrutiny, her intimacy as an
expectant mother concerning the circumstances of conception and
birth, and the intimacy relating to her personal health, especially
her decisions for final care.27
There is no set classification of rights. However, in this list of
particularized rights, there are rights that might be recognized as
rights of privacy; there are also other rights, sometimes referred to
as personality rights, e.g. privacy-based and property-based
protection of her image, and the protection of her reputation; and,
there are rights that relate to her physical integrity, e.g. the
intimacy of her body and the circumstances of conception. Indeed,
intimacy, privacy, and integrity often are used synonymously.28
27.
The discussion draft of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico refers to the
right of intimacy (intimidad) as a fundamental right (derecho esencial) in the
text of its art. 8 of Book One (Jural Relations). See Comisión Conjunta
Permanente para la Revisión y Reforma del Código Civil de Puerto Rico,
Memorial Explicativo, Código Civil de Puerto Rico (Borrador para discusión)
(revised March 5, 2003) 14, available at http://www.oslpr.org (last visited
February 21, 2011). See also the comments on various rights of intimacy. Id. at
9, 10, 11, 20, 33, 39, 41 and 42. Both dignity (dignidad), joined to the concept of
honor (honor), and physical and moral integrity (integridad fisica y moral) are
specified rights in art. 8. Id. at 14. Dignity and intimacy are used to describe the
rights of an expectant mother. Id. at 10. Respect of dignity and integrity is
required for autopsies and for the disposal of remains and bodily parts. Id. at 37.
28.
There are language problems when talking about intimacy. Although
intimacy, in English and Spanish, embody similar notions of close friendship and
sexual relations, the words ―privacidad” and ―intimidad,” in Spanish, both
express the idea of ―privacy‖ in English. See THE OXFORD SPANISH DICTIONARY
1593 (3d ed., Oxford University Press, 2003). The French Civil Code relates the
concept of ―intimité” (intimacy) to the concept of ―vie privée” (private life). See
art. 9, Code Civil 2010 (Éditions Dalloz, Paris, 2009).
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They are all attached to the general notion of dignity,29 and dignity
is itself identified both as a separate attribute of the person and an
overarching notion of the human condition. Indeed, dignity-atlarge patently requires a high level of respect for the way by which
a person fashions her private life and the degree to which her
private life is, aptly and fortunately, strange. It is her étrangeté that
announces not only her diversity and her choice of intimacy, but
also her enigma and her mysterium.30
Yet, in a person‘s private life, intimacy is not limited to her
emotions or sentiments or to her privacy. Nor is it limited to her
right of privacy of sexual intimacy. It goes beyond her sexuality
and sexual conduct.31 Its expression, in general terms, as a right,
embraces a right of intimate association between adults and a right
of choice of a close personal, economic, social, and sexual
relationship32 with another person. It also refers to other close or
29.
The Supreme Court of Canada has defined ―dignity.‖ See M. v. H,
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, para. 261 (Supreme Court of Canada). “The central purpose
of the equality guarantee in s. 15(1) of the Charter is the protection and
promotion of human dignity. The concept of human dignity is concerned with
the autonomy, self-worth, and self-respect of individuals. As Iacobucci J. points
out in Law [Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1
S.C.R. 497], . . . ―[h]uman dignity is harmed by unfair treatment premised upon
personal traits or circumstances which do not relate to individual needs,
capacities, or merits.‖ Id. Iacobucci, J.‘s conception of human dignity would
seem to reflect the thin meaning of this term. See Doron Shultziner, Human
Dignity–Functions and Meanings, GLOBAL JURIST TOPICS 1, 12-16 (vol. 3, issue
3, article 3) (2003) (defining the thin meaning of human dignity as a meaning
related to humiliation and self-worth). Shultziner explains how the thin meaning
relates to other meanings:
Whereas rights and duties, and honor, are contained within the
upward wide moral view that is meant to harmonize human
moral worth and one‘s proper social-political relation with other
human beings, the thin meaning is contained within a thin moral
view that is focused on the crude violation of that basic moral
worth.
Id. at 12.
30.
Didier Eribon quotes the French poet René Char (1907–1988) as
saying: ―Développez votre étrangeté légitime.” See DIDIER ERIBON, REFLEXIONS
SUR LA QUESTION GAY 486 (Fayard, Paris, 1999). The French word ―étrangeté‖
embraces, as perhaps the English ―strangeness‖ does, meanings of singularity,
originality and, of course, eccentricity. See also M. v. H., supra note 29 at para.
260 (Gonthier J.) ―It is important to note that it is not a denial of human dignity
to recognize difference; to the contrary, acknowledging individual personal traits
is a means of fostering human dignity. By recognizing individuality, and
rejecting forced uniformity, the law celebrates differences, fostering the
autonomy and integrity of the individual.‖ Id. at para. 262.
31.
See infra Part. III & IV.
32.
For the right of choice of a sexual relationship, see, e.g., Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). ―The fact that
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intimate associations that encompass most, but not necessarily all,
of these relational aspects. These associations involve living
together.33 They do not imply and are not predicated on sexual
relations, although access to state-administered benefits may
require some sort of sexual relationship.34 This right of intimate
association might be said to belong to a new category of privatelaw rights—civil equality rights. These rights are linked to notions
of equality before the law and to protection against unlawful
discrimination.35 The notion of civil equality rights relates to the
following question and answer. Who is entitled to civil rights?
Everyone.
The right of intimacy, at large, relates to status and to the
capacity to perform specific activities. Status is understood to have
two classic components: status civitatis (nationality) and status
familiae (family status) although other notions of status, such a
person‘s age, health, profession, or occupation, have surfaced.36
Status answers the questions: who is a legal subject, and who
possess rights? In the 19th century, non-nationals had limited civil
rights in many legal systems. In modern law, the concept of
nationality as a portal to capacity has been largely displaced by

individuals define themselves in a significant way through their sexual
relationships suggests...that much of the richness of a relationship will come
from the freedom to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal
bonds.‖ Id.
33.
On the rational and sentimental meaning of ―living together‖, see
generally Nicholas Kasirer, What Is Vie Commune? Qu'est-ce que living
together?, in MELANGES PAUL-ANDRE CREPEAU 487 (Cowansville, Yvon Blais,
1997).
34.
For example, private-law and public-law benefits and obligations, in
Canada, under the federal authority and administered by that authority, have
been extended to ―. . . all couples who have been cohabiting in a conjugal
relationship for at least one year, in order to reflect values of tolerance, respect
and equality, consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.‖
See Summary, An Act to modernize the Statutes of Canada in relation to benefits
and obligations, S.C. 2000, c.12 (Bill C-23). What is ―a conjugal relationship‖?
It has long been presumed that this type of relationship must be marriage-like
and involve sexual relations. For a discussion of conjugality and nonconjugality, see generally Brenda Cossman and Bruce Ryder, What is MarriageLike Like?, 18 CAN. J. FAM. L. 269 (2001). The Supreme Court of Canada has
observed that a conjugal relationship may exist even in the absence of a sexual
relationship. Id. at 291-300 (discussing the Court‘s views of conjugality in the
context of a same-sex relationship).
35.
See Carbonnier, supra note 20, at 158-163, 174177.
36.
But see Aubry & Rau, supra note 9, at 355-357 (arguing that notions
of the physical state of a person, her age, health, social position, religion,
profession or occupation, are not status matters).
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domicile. Today, status is mostly concerned with acts of civil
status that identify the person as born,37 married, or dead, provide
her with a name, fix her domicile, and sometimes identify her
ethnic or cultural group.38 Capacity answers the questions: who is
able to enjoy civil rights, and who can exercise these rights?39
The right of intimacy has patrimonial and extrapatrimonial
consequences in that, patrimonially, an intimate association refers
to a person‘s voluntary undertakings to acquire assets and assume
liabilities in the close presence of another (and to that person‘s
profit or detriment) and, extrapatrimonially, intimacy relates to her
right of privacy of the personal, economic, social and sexual
aspects of her intimate association (and the duties of recognition of
others‘ intimacy). Her rights commit her to the discharge of her
duties. The respect of her intimacy is companion to her respect of
the intimacy of others in whose favor her rights are impressed with
a trust.40
For the most part, the meaning of intimacy has been understood
either in terms of fundamental freedoms and the public law‘s
approval or disapproval of intimate sexual relations, or in terms of
37.
The act of birth will be the first act of civil status to indicate a
person‘s sex: male or female. However, there are intersexual children, and there
is a wide range of intersexual states. Chau and Herring have recently examined
the topic and advocate a legal definition of sex that recognizes a scale of sexual
identity or a sexual continuum. They admit that this has obvious consequences
for marriage. See Pak-Lee Chau and Jonathan Herring, Men, Women, People:
The Definition of Sex, in SEXUALITY REPOSITIONED–DIVERSITY AND THE LAW
187 (Brooks-Gordon et al. eds., Hart Publishing, Oxford-Portland, 2004). As a
result, the law will no longer place any legal significance on sexual differences.
Id. at 206. ―Instead of talking of men and women the law will treat each
individual as a person...‖ Id. at 207.
38.
On the interdependence of culture and national law, see Marie-Noël
Capogna, Identité juridique et identité culturelle de la personne physique: quels
rapports?, in L‘IDENTITE DE LA PERSONNE HUMAINE–ÉTUDE DE DROIT
FRANÇAIS ET DE DROIT COMPARE 911, 919-922 (J. Pousson-Petit ed., Bruyant,
Brussels, 2002).
39.
The capacity to enjoy civil rights is sometimes referred to as
―aptitude.‖ See CIVIL CODE REVISION OFFICE, REPORT ON THE QUEBEC CIVIL
CODE–VOLUME II–COMMENTARIES–Tome 1, Books 1 to 4 (Éditeur officiel,
Quebec, 1977). Id. at 23. See also Aubry & Rau, at 357. ―[La] capacité juridique
est l‘aptitude à devenir le sujet de droit et d‘obligations et à les exercer.‖ Id.
Important, however, is the distinction between status and capacity. Id. 357-358,
note 13.
40.
See John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 1 at
1, 51–2 (discussing the philosophy of property law and its moral content). ―[A]t
the same time [property rights] are morally subject to a kind of inchoate trust,
mortgage, lien, or usufruct in favour of all other persons.‖ Id. at 51.
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marriage and the private law‘s disapproval of non-marital relations
and its sole regard for marriage as generative of the family and,
hence, of the personal status of a citizen and home of her juridical
personality.41 The law imagines and images intimacy
horizontally.42 Therefore, it is no surprise that the institutions of
marriage and the husband-wife-child family, in much of the secular
positive law of the West, have been classically considered as the
ideal, if not sole, repositories for husband-wife sexual action.43
Indeed, historically and in the Common Era, the secular West has
considered the disembodiment of sexual action from the institution
of marriage as dystopian.
Until recently, the sexual action of marriage has been an idée
fixe underscoring the private law of persons. It has been framed as
―an act which in its intentions and kind is apt to actualize, express,
and allow the spouses to experience their friendship, commitment,
and openness to procreation of offspring.‖44
41.
See also Fineman, supra note 16 at 145-147. Moreover, Borrillo
states that early Christian thinkers originally considered the sexual action of
marriage as a necessary sin; it was necessary to contain luxuria (lust, wantonness
or concupiscence)–and, of course, to direct it to propagation. See generally
Daniel Borrillo, La luxure-L‟orthodoxie matrimoniale comme remède contre les
errances de la passion, in LES SEPT PECHES CAPITAUX ET LE DROIT PRIVE
(Fortin et al. eds., Éditions Thémis, Montreal, 2007).
42.
See Fineman, id., at 145-146.
. . . the family is experienced as an institution of primarily
―horizontal‖ intimacy, founded on the romantic sexual affiliation
between one man and one woman. The dominant paradigm,
however, privileges the couples as foundational and fundamental.
. . . Intergenerational relationships–vertical lines of intimacy–may
be temporarily accommodated . . . Children achieve adulthood and
go on to form their own discrete, primary, horizontal and sexual
connections . . .
Id. at 146.
The image of horizontally organized intimacy is a crucial
component of contemporary patriarchal ideology in that it ensures
that men are perceived as central to the family.
Id. at 147.
43.
Fineman proposes the re-orientation of the concept of the husbandwife-child family (and the constitutional and common–law protection of its
privacy) towards a core family unit of mother-child. See Martha Albertson
Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family: The Limits of Privacy, 23
CONN. L. REV 955 (1991). ―Family and sexuality would not be confluent, rather,
mother-child formation would be the ―natural‖ or core family unit; it would be
the base entity around which social policy and legal rules are fashioned. The
intergenerational, nonsexual organization of intimacy is what would be protected
and privileged in law and policy.‖ Id. at 971.
44.
See Finnis, supra note 40 at 42. Finnis discusses the meaning of fides
in Thomas Aquinas as one of marital friendship. ―This positive fides is the
willingness and commitment to belong to, and be united in mind and body with,
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This rigid conception is, for all intents and purposes, the idea
of the sexual action of marriage prevalent both in the secular
tradition of the West and in the catechetic tradition of most of the
Christian West.45 From a certain perspective, marriage is a truth
claim–a claim, like all truth claims, that is a ―compelling story told
by persons in positions of power in order to perpetuate their way of
seeing and organizing the natural and social world.‖46 Today,
powerful marriage-narrators are inciting people to attribute social
ills and to project the failures of marriage onto other intimate
associations. In this way and as René Girard might say, people
mimetically channel the deficiencies of marriage onto legally
vulnerable relationships. These relationships become institutional
scapegoats.47
one‘s spouse in the distinct form of societas and friendship which we call
marriage.‖ See John Finnis, The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual
Relations: Some Philosophical and Historical Observations, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 97,
108 (1997). Fides is ―the whole justice, usefulness, pleasure …, and delight…in
shared virtue which can be found in a good marriage with its division of
complementary roles.‖ Id. at note 40. For Finnis, sexual acts are not unitive
unless they are marital, and they are not marital unless they involve fides and
procreation. Marital sexual acts have ―procreative significance‖ because they are
―. . . actualizations, so far as the spouses then and there can, of the reproductive
function in which they are biologically and thus personally one.‖ See John
Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation,” 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1049, 1067 (1994).
45.
There are said to be two ethical traditions in the Christian West:
Catholic and Protestant. See ERIC FUCHS, SEXUAL DESIRE & LOVE 149-167
(Marsha Daigle trans., 1983). ―. . . Catholic ethics remain faithful to the patristic
tradition: sexuality belongs to the order of impurity having no justification other
than procreation. . . ‖ Id. at 150. The Protestant tradition focuses on the couple.
Each owes the other affection and tenderness, Id. at 161. ―Thus begins a
reflection on the couple, which aims more and more at bringing out its value, by
going beyond the traditional notion of procreation as the primary justification for
conjugal life.‖ Id. For Fuchs, the West does not appear to include the East, that is
to say, the Eastern and Oriental Churches, notwithstanding the Eastern
ecclesiastical tradition of some European countries, e.g., Bulgaria, Romania, and
Greece. Moreover, it is altogether unclear whether the Latin and Greek patristic
traditions are identical on the topic of marriage and procreation.
46.
See Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Theology and the Condition of
Postmodernity: A Report on Knowledge (of God), in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO POSTMODERN THEOLOGY 11 (Kevin J. Vanhoozer ed.,
Cambridge University Press, 2003) (discussing postmodernism in truth and
history).
47.
See Austen Ivereigh et al., In Conversation–Scapegoats and
Saviours, THE TABLET, Oct. 16, 2004 at 8 (summarizing Girard‘s thinking). ―We
learn from one another what it is we desire, he [Girard] argues, and then desire
it, imitating one another. This ―mimetic desire then encourages us to channel our
violence towards vulnerable people (the scapegoats) at times of crisis, as if this
resolves the problem.‖ Id. See also René Girard, Mimesis and Violence, in THE
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Very important economic and social benefits flow from this
sexual action. Does the sexual profile of marriage (whether
procreative intercourse and marital friendship, procreation alone,
or discouragement of promiscuity and concupiscence) sufficiently
justify a disregard of the sexual action (if there are sexual
relations), commitment, and friendship of other intimate
associations in modern society?
The sexual profile of this elite institution48 does not justify this
disregard and does not adequately sustain its claim to selfappropriation of substantially all economic aspects of intimate
bonds, as is the case in many Western systems. Nor is the affective
profile of a person (her emotions, her psyche, and her spirit)
delimited by the nuptial profile of the human body, as it appears to
be in a certain ecclesial tradition.49 Indeed, the assertion that
―[marriage] is an instrinsic good, with two constitutive and
mutually supportive aspects, friendship and procreation‖50 does not
provide a full and rational account for the objectives of legal rules
and institutions that are disinterested (or only marginally
interested) in marital friendship and procreation,51 such as
GIRARD READER 9-19 (James G. Williams ed., 1996) (summarizing his mimetic
model).
48.
See Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, For Love & Money: Has Marriage
Become an Elite Institution, COMMONWEALT, Dec. 2, 2005, at 6 (discussing
today‘s marriage as a privilege reserved to the well-educated and wealthy).
49. See Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Pastores Dabo Vobis to the
Bishops, Clergy and Faithful on the Formation of Priests in the Circumstances of
the Present Day, March 25, 1992, para. 44. The Exhortation tells us that
―affective maturity presupposes an awareness that love has a central role in
human life.‖ Id. Moreover, ―[m]an cannot live without love. He remains a being
that is incomprehensible for himself; his life is meaningless if love is not
revealed to him, if he does not encounter love, if he does not experience it and
make it his own, if he does not participate intimately.‖ Id. The text then states: ―.
. . we are speaking of a love that involves the entire person, in all his or her
aspects–physical, psychic and spiritual–and which is expressed in the ―nuptial
meaning‖ of the human body, thanks to which a person gives oneself to another
and takes the other to oneself.‖ Id. Affective maturity brings to celibate priests
―serene friendship and deep brotherliness.‖ Id.
50.
Finnis, supra note 40, at 43.
51. Apart from the rational disjunction, in very many cases, between
procreation and governmental rules and policies regulating the economic
consequences of intimate associations, is it not a reasonable proposition that
global population growth and, for example, the chronic poverty, disease, and
burgeoning populations of sub-Saharan Africa, militate against institutional
policies favoring procreation? These policies would appear irresponsible, even in
the West. For a readable overview discussing population growth over the next 50
years, see Joel E. Cohen, Human Population grows up, SCI. AM., Sept. 2005 at
48-55 (outlining problems relating to population growth) and Jeffrey D. Sachs,
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retirement pensions, spousal survivorship benefits, and access to
public housing. Should two intimates‘ entitlement to homestead
protection conform to the sexual strictures of St. Paul?
Investigations into the functional underpinning of rules and
institutions, especially of public authorities, should not be reserved
to the scrutiny of the sexual and affective profiles of same-sex
couples. Indeed, the notion of an intimate association extends to a
great number of people who are unmarried, divorced, widows or
widowers. Stories of these intimates are not stories, in the sense of
fables, but stories, in the sense of real experiences.52
Now, what is the content of juridical personality and how does
it relate to the right of intimacy?
III. ATTRIBUTES OF JURIDICAL PERSONALITY
Juridical personality53 is also known as legal personality, and
sometimes as legal personhood. In the civil law tradition—a
Can Extreme Poverty be eliminated?, id. at 56-65 (discussing poverty and
proposing solutions).
52.
Roderick Macdonald, first President of the Law Commission of
Canada, tells the story of the fiftieth wedding anniversary of his wife‘s parents.
The anniversary celebration included only a small number of actually married
couples. See RODERICK ALEXANDER MACDONALD, LESSONS OF EVERYDAY LAW
59–63 (McGill-Queen‘s University Press, 2002). Macdonald relates:
There were an elderly brother and sister (a widower and widow)
who had been sharing an apartment for five years. There were two
sisters who had never married and who had lived in the same
house for over 40 years. There were two air force friends of my
father-in-law (one widowed, one divorced) who also were sharing
an apartment. There were three unmarried couples in their forties
and fifties who had each been living together for more than a
decade after their respective divorces. There were single fathers
and single mothers trying to re-establish a relationship with a new
partner. There were never-married guests currently living alone
who had in the past been involved in a longterm relationship. And
there was one same-sex couple. The obvious diversity of these
domestic situations caused me to realize just how few longmarried, never-divorced couples such as my wife‘s parents there
really were, and just how many other forms of a stable domestic
relationship now exist.
Id. at 60.
53.
Juridical personality is known under many names. In the structured
environment of civil codes of the civil law tradition, the term ―juridical
personality‖ (personalité juridique) is used in the Civil Code of Québec (see,
e.g., C.C.Q. art. 1) for both human beings, ―natural persons‖ (personnes
physiques), and ―legal persons‖ (personnes morales) (corporations and other
entities constituted by law) (see e.g. C.C.Q., art. 3083). The Civil Code of Chile
employs ―juridical personality‖ (personalidad jurídica) (see e.g. art. 54) but
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tradition noted for its scientific approach to these matters—the
personality or civil personality of human beings is often contrasted
with the juridical personality, legal personality, or the moral
personality of entities. In that legal tradition, human persons are
natural persons or physical persons, and entities are juridical
persons, legal persons, or moral persons. In the common law
tradition–a tradition that is said to know little and to care less for
the construct of personality—there are sightings of artificial
personality, artificial persons, and juristic persons.54 Generally
reserves its use to entities. The Louisiana Civil Code uses ―natural personality‖
for human beings (see e.g. C.C. art. 25). The term ―civil personality‖
(―personalidade civil‖) is used in the new Brazilian Civil Code of 2002 (see e.g.
C.C. art. 2) and in the Spanish Civil Code (see e.g. C.C. art. 32) for human
beings. ―Juridical personality‖ makes a civil law appearance in the English
language version of the draft Québec Civil Code (1977) (see e.g. art. 1) although
the English language version of the 1976 committee report for this draft Code
uses the word ―legal personality.‖ Human beings are known as natural persons
(Quebec, Chile, Louisiana, Brazil, and Spain) and entities are called either
juridical persons (Chile, Louisiana, Brazil, and Spain) or legal persons (in the
English version of the Civil Code of Québec). In Louisiana, an in vitro fertilized
human ovum is a ―juridical person‖ (see e.g. R.S. 9:124). French doctrinal
writing uses ―juridical personality‖ for both persons and entities, but often
―personalité juridique” appears as a term reserved for entities. In the French
Civil Code, the terms ―moral personality‖ (personalité morale) and ―moral
person‖ (personne morale) make a showing (see e.g. C.C. art. 1842, 1844-1845).
The Civil Code of Argentina distinguishes between personas de existencia
visible and personas de existencia ideal also called personas jurídicas (see e.g.
art. 32). For an extensive list of persons with their attributes, see the entries
under ―Persona‖ in MANUEL OSSORIO, DICCIONARIO DE CIENCIAS JURÍDICAS,
POLÍTICAS Y SOCIALES (31st ed., Heliasta, Buenos Aires, 2005). Finally, it
should be noted that the English language commonly uses one word, ―legal‖, as
a descriptive for matters of ius and lex. Moreover, when civil law terms are
expressed in English, there are obvious challenges of translation.
In the common law, the term ―legal personality‖ is much preferred, but is
most often limited to ―legal persons‖, ―artificial persons‖, or ―juristic persons‖,
such as corporations and associations. The term ―legal personality‖ is not used to
describe an overarching concept of the person, embracing natural and juristic
persons. But see W. M. Geldart, Legal Personality, 27 L.Q. REV. 90, 95 (1911).
There are sightings of ―artificial personality‖ especially for public bodies,
religious bodies, foreign states and international organizations.
In American legal writing, the use of ―juridical personality‖ as applicable to
the rights of individuals is rare. But see, e.g., Gary A. Ahrens, Privacy and
Property: Can They Remain After Juridical Personality is Lost?, 11 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 1077, 1079, 1132, 1134, 1136 (1977-1978). In the social sciences, there
are references to both the juridical and the legal personality of human persons.
54.
On the topic of persons and personality in English law, see generally
William Swadling, Property: General Principles, in 1 ENGLISH PRIVATE L. 141155 (Peter Birks ed., Oxford University Press, 2000). The English courts are said
to have no use for ―personality.‖
Questions of this sort do not often strike the English courts as
having a practical bearing on the cases which they must decide,
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speaking, in the common law, human persons are persons, tout
court.
In this paper, ―juridical personality‖ expresses the right-owning
and duty-owing status of human persons.
Every natural person has juridical personality, and every entity
has juridical personality to the extent allowed by law.55 The
juridical personality of the natural person does not depend on the
sovereign; that of the entity largely does.
The personality of a natural person vests at birth56 although it
may, in certain cases, exist at the moment of conception or at some
intermediate time between conception and birth, whether or not a
viable birth. The boundary posts separating the fertilized ovum or
the fetus, as a potential human being (but, in law, often still
considered a thing or entity), from the right-owning-duty-owing
human person, frequently shift in the minds of lawmakers, judges,
and scholars. Yet, identification of viable human existence is
crucial to the exercise of important rights.
Simply put, juridical personality is the enjoyment of rights and
the capacity to exercise these rights. It is also expressed as the
capacity for jural relations (or legal relations).57 It is real law,
especially in most of the civil law tradition, because it has a
legislative expression. Moreover, in the civil law, where scholarly
and even when they declare themselves to be ‗concerned with
abstract jurisprudential concepts [so far as these] assist towards
clarity of thought‘, they generally recoil from discussing them in
any detail.
Id. at 144.
55.
Dias summarizes Kelsen as arguing that the ―biological character of
human beings is outside the [law]‘s province‖ and that, moreover, there is no
distinction in law between ―natural‖ and ―legal‖ persons. See R. W. M. DIAS,
JURISPRUDENCE 267 (5th ed., Butterworths, London, 1985). The importance of
juridical personality, as a legal construct, is disputed. For example, there has
been considerable debate on the necessity of this construct for legal entities and,
even if necessary, its nature and scope. Dias outlines the theories. Id. at 265-269.
56.
For some, a ―human being‖ may arguably exist on or about the time
of conception, and a human being might become a ―human person‖ sometime
thereafter. An ecclesiological conception of personality might be based on yet
another event, for example baptism. In the Roman Catholic Church, it is at
baptism that a person is the subject of rights and duties and, therefore, is
conferred with canonical legal personality. See 1983 Code c. 96. Spiritual
personality is another concept. See 1983 Code c. 204, § 1.
57.
Smith cites Salmond as defining a ―legal‖ person as ―any being to
whom the law attributes a capacity of interests and, therefore, of rights, of acts
and, therefore, of duties.‖ See Salmond, Jurisprudence 273 (5th ed., 1916) cited
in Bryant Smith, Legal Personality, 37 YALE L. J. 283, 284 (1927-1928). This
definition conflates the two concepts of enjoyment of rights and exercise of
rights.
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writing is considered a source of the law, albeit a secondary
source, juridical personality has an important doctrinal expression.
In the West, juridical personality is also abstract law. To study it,
as a conception, is a way of understanding the nature of rules
governing the general conduct of a person and his relations to other
persons and to things.58 Its finality is to correctly structure capacity
for jural relations. It does so from two very real and practical
perspectives. First, the exercise of rights and duties may be limited,
such as in cases of minority or incompetence, as but two examples.
Second, although the enjoyment of civil rights and fundamental
freedoms may never be renounced, the exercise of some of these
rights may be waived under certain circumstances.
Jural relations are relations between people and between people
and things that have consequences in the law. Not all intimate
relations between persons are jural relations because the law does
not have a rule (or does not care to have a rule) to regulate all
possible intimacies. By like token, not all aspects of intimate
associations and not all their commonplace events interest the law.
However, to the extent that the law is sufficiently interested or
intrigued by the daily routine and experience of intimates,59 it
provides rules for the coordination of jural relations.
These rules or ―sorts of law‖ are described by Honoré: rules of
existence, categorizing rules, rules of scope, position-specifying
rules, and directly normative rules.60 Various aspects of juridical
58.
A lawyer‘s collection of books can indicate the contours of his
juridical personality. His law books may act as guides and pointers to the sorts
and qualities of his relationships with family, friends, colleagues, and other legal
actors or subjects. In this regard, see Angela Fernandez, Albert Mayrand‟s
Private Law Library: An Investigation of the Person, the Law of Persons, and
„Legal Personality‟ in a Collection of Law Books, 53 UNIV. OF TORONTO L.J. 37
(2003).
59.
The topic of ―everyday‖ law is examined by Macdonald. See
generally Macdonald, supra note 52 at 1–12. Macdonald states that experience,
wisdom, and good judgment provide the authority for everyday law and that this
everyday law makes official law possible. Id. at 6-7.
60. See generally A. M. Honoré, Real Laws, in LAW, MORALITY AND
SOCIETY–ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H. L. A. HART 99 (Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1977).
1. Existence laws create, destroy, or provide for the existence or
non-existence of entities . . . 3. Categorizing rules explain how to
translate actions, events, and other facts into the appropriate
categories. 4. Rules of scope fix the scope of other rules. 5.
Position-specifying rules set out the legal position of persons or
things in terms of rights, liabilities, status, and the like. 6. Directly
normative rules . . . guide the conduct of the citizen as such.
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personality can be assigned to one or another of these classes of
rules; however, juridical personality is really about status and the
capacity to enjoy and exercise rights related to that status;
accordingly, the rules are, in large part, position-specifying.
Civil rights and fundamental freedoms are extrapatrimonial
rights. The law provides recourses for undue interference with
them. When there has been actionable interference with these
rights, they are patrimonialized because damage claims have a
monetary value.
How many rights and freedoms are there? They certainly
include the right to sue in court, the right to acquire, own, and
dispose of property, the right to life, the right to personal and
physical integrity, the right to the safeguard of one‘s reputation,
and the right of privacy. Examples of rights of privacy might
include a right to prevent unlawful interception of private
correspondence and a right to prevent the disclosure of personal
information. Codes and statutes specify seemingly innumerable
rights: the right to refuse specimen taking or tissue removal, the
right to alienate a body part, the right of a child to the protection,
security and attention of his parents, and the list goes on. Civil
codes in the civil law list these rights but the list of any particular
civil code is a function of the time and place of its writing and
whether the lawmaker at the time considered it expedient to
formally express these rights. Today, the rights to make healthcare
decisions and to protect private personal and financial information
are topical; tomorrow, intimacy of association may be the order of
the day.
The Civil Code of Québec61 provides an example of a recent
approach to the architecture and enumeration of rights. After a
preliminary title on the enjoyment and exercise of civil rights in its
book on persons, the code has a second title on personality rights.
The first chapter of the second title announces the integrity of the
person (―Every person is inviolable and is entitled to the integrity
of his person . . . ‖) in a single article.62 That chapter then proceeds
to its first section on the care of the person63 and its second section
Id. at 112. His second class, ―rules of inference,‖ relates to proof and
evidence.
61.
See CIVIL CODE OF QUÉBEC (18th ed., Jean-Maurice Brisson &
Nicholas Kasirer eds., 2010-2011) (hereinafter C.C.Q.).
62.
Id. at art.10.
63.
Id. at art. 11-25.
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on confinement in an institution and psychiatric assessment.64 Its
second chapter provides for children‘s rights.65 Its third chapter
deals with the respect of a person‘s reputation and privacy. 66 Its
final chapter provides for the respect of the body after death.67
Much of the rest of the book is devoted to particulars of status
(name, change of name, change of designation of sex, records of
civil status, etc.)68 and capacity (majority, minority, emancipation,
and various form of protective supervision for incapables).69 The
draft Civil Code of Puerto Rico has a more extensive list of rights,
including the right of intimacy and physical and moral integrity, in
its principal article (article 8) on the enjoyment of derechos
esenciales (fundamental rights), but fewer specific details than the
Quebec code, save in connection with the integrity and care of the
person.70
Rights pre-exist their restatement in formal constitutions and
statutes, but the understanding of rights occurs in the legal and
social environment where their pre-existing nature is first (or
again) debated. In this regard, it might be stated—and
unequivocally so—that the sovereign authority, through its
legislative bodies and courts, merely recognizes rights that arise
from the particular actions and conduct of people at particular
times. How could it be otherwise? Does it seem credible to assert
that rights, including rights of intimacy, spring as spontaneously in
formal law (because the formal law purports to have created them)
as sprung Venus from Neptune‘s life-giving froth? Formal law and
public law do not create rights; they specify them.71
Indeed, the thrust of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights is that the human rights noted in the Universal Declaration
are innate and that their pre-existence is simply made textually
explicit in that declaration; accordingly, formal expression of all
rights, including the general right of intimacy, occurs in contexts of
place and time. Formal law hopes (but can do no more than hope)
that it has expressed the rights according to the best contemporary
(and informed) understanding of their inherent nature. As often
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at art. 26-31.
Id. at art. 32-34.
Id. at art. 35-41.
Id. at art. 42-49.
Id. at art. 50-152.
Id. at art. 153-297.
See supra note 27.
See supra note 13 for the position in English public law.
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happens, rights are made juridic—juridified as it were-in a single,
static form. In these cases, the challenge lies in re-establishing the
connection with the human person.
The right of intimate association as a real (and not supposed)
civil right and fundamental freedom in cosmopolitan private law is,
indeed, contextual because it is a good to and for persons and
because it is experienced by persons living, as they do, at a
particular time and in a particular place in the West.72 In other
words, its content is historically conditioned and, on account of
this historical mediation, intimate association can be objectively
assessed. Its intrinsic goodness can be concretely and specifically
understood.
In sum, the legal content of intimacy is not the private
transcendent experience of any one individual (or lawmaker).73
The intimacy and dignity of ―inclusive moral citizenship‖74 is
adverse to platitudes of family and sexual morality that do not take
account of the social and economic life of every individual in the
community. Intimacy is readily plastic. It is predicated on the good
experience of the living. Since this is so, intimacy cannot be
delimited; it cannot be restricted to a particular set of human
experiences, especially those sourced in invented traditions.
Recognition of intimate associations will not entice people away
from marriage. Indeed, even if all heterosexual and homosexual
intimate associations, other than marriage, are adjudged morally

72.
Beyond the formal law and constitutional framework of any
particular system, there are supranational and global communitarian aspects to
human rights. See generally Carl F. Stychin, Same-Sex Sexualities and the
Globalization of Human Rights Discourse, 49 MCGILL L. J. 951 (2004)
(discussing the use of universal human rights by local gay rights activists and
arguing that rights struggles will be successful when based on international
human rights standards and global, communitarian political debate).
73.
The law can be understood in a manner not dissimilar to the
theological phenomenon of revelation. Roger Haight says that revelation is
experiential and that, as religious experience, it is historically mediated. See
ROGER HAIGHT, DYNAMICS OF THEOLOGY 51-67 (2001) (discussing the structure
of revelation). Haight discusses (and argues against) transcendental analysis. Id.
at 6-7. For the theologian Haight and for the legal scholar Sinha, man belongs to
his history. See Sinha, note 5 at 3.
74.
For the use of the phrase ―inclusive moral citizenship,‖ see Fourie
and Bonthuys v. Minister of Home Affairs, case no 232/2003 (Supreme Court of
Appeal of South Africa, 2004) at 10. This South African case recognized samesex marriage as valid.
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destructive to the institution of marriage, surely these associations
cannot be any more destructive than divorce and remarriage.75
The narrative of intimacy (together with its happy post-modern
disorder!76) is next discussed.
IV. SOURCES OF INTIMACY
Pure reason–the practical reason of natural law philosophers–is
neither a satisfactory nor a truly rational method of examining
intimacy. It presupposes that there is but a single, correct reason
for human conduct. It ignores the here-and-now factual situations
that meaningfully contextualize reason. Pure reason disregards the
plurality of rational and sentient ways of defining intimate
associations, in the East and the West. It takes no stock of different
logics and reasonings that are predicated on different community
realities and values. In this light, it would seem that the proponents
of natural law approaches reckon social anthropology as a useless
science vacant of any forward-looking telos. Only theological
anthropology would seem deserving.77 Nonetheless, even unkind

78. See Charles E. Curran, Sexual Orientation and Human Rights in
American Religious Discourse: A Roman Catholic Perspective, in SEXUAL
ORIENTATION & HUMAN RIGHTS IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE 85, 97-98
(Saul M. Olyan & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., Oxford University Press, 1998).
―Thus one could maintain that the provision of domestic partnership laws does
less harm to marriage and the family than do the existing laws about divorced
and remarried people.‖ Id. at 98. Importantly, domestic partnership laws respond
to human economic and social needs. See also Margaret A. Farley, Response to
James Hanigan and Charles Curran, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION & HUMAN
RIGHTS IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE, supra at 101, 108 (stating that
domestic partnerships respond to needs for psychic security, economic security,
and sometimes physical safely). Farley understands domestic partnerships in the
sense of legal unions reserved to gays and lesbians. Id. at 106-108.
76.
Disorder and post-modernism are neatly (and nicely) associated in
Roderick A. Macdonald, Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes and
Legal Pluralism, 15 ARIZ. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 69, 71 (1998). ―If, as a
conception of social organization, modernism was primarily about rationalism,
universalism, certainty and order, post-modernism seems to be about
empiricism, particularism, indeterminacy and disorder.‖ Id. at 71.
77.
On account of fallen human nature, the need for redemption and the
doctrines of original sin, judgment and atonement, legal theory may not be split
from theological doctrine. See John J. Couglin, Canon Law and the Human
Person, 19 J. OF L. & REL. 1, 56 (2003-2004). Coughlin discusses the secular
and theological doctrines of human will and freedom. Id. at 53. Mainstream
legal theory has a negative concept of freedom, i.e. an absence of constraint and
an over-emphasis of autonomy and subjective preferences. This negative theory
leads to an inability to act for human good and an inability to understand that
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critics of natural law agree that its suppositions and theories must
be carefully considered. Natural law, therefore, remains a vital
trampoline for discussion and debate.
A diversity of intimate associations necessitates a method for
the determination of their legal parameters. How do we know what
we know about personal associations? Is there a strict
methodological path, or is there a multiplicity of paths? Does a
hierarchical disorder of relevant sources lead to approaches that are
too relaxed for any practical and useful understanding of the topic?
Legal methodology may be defined as the study of legal knowhow. It is the study of those legal methods and techniques that
allow the law to be known and understood (fundamental
methodology) as well as implemented (applied methodology). The
topic of sources is essential to legal methodology. This topic is
interested in answering the questions: ―Where do I find the law?‖
and ―Where is the essence, cause or origin of the law?‖ In this
way, the discovery of sources tries to offer a tentative answer to
the general question: ―What is it to have knowledge of the law.‖78
The word sources is used in two different senses. Sometimes
sources of law means material sources, that is to say, ―where
lawyers look in order to find out what the law is.‖79 Sometimes
sources of law means the sources of legal justifications or formal
reasons, that is to say, the grouping of ―. . . legally authoritative
reasons on which judges and others are empowered or required to
base a decision or action . . .‖80 There are numberless sources that
might constitute sufficient authority for legal decisions relating to
intimacy and intimate associations. The identification of these
sources is not difficult. It is the classification and ranking of these
sources as, say, primary or secondary, or authoritative or
persuasive, and the determination whether they are, for example,
obligatory, prudential, hortatory, or illustrative, that is highly
problematic.

transcendence of self-interest is necessary for genuine human fulfillment. Id. at
53-57.
78.
GEOFFREY SAMUEL, EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHOD IN LAW 6 (2003)
(asking: what is it to have knowledge of the law?).
79.
See John Bell, Sources of Law, in 1 ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW 3 (Peter
Birks ed., Oxford University Press, 2000).
80.
See P.S. ATIYAH AND ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 2 (Oxford, 1987).
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In these matters, Western courts have latched onto different
approaches.
In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,81 the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reformulated the definition
of marriage to include same-sex couples. The Court cited case-law
and statute law, with very occasional references to law books.82
The Court‘s psychological and sociological observations were
unsupported.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Canada made use of a
catholic selection of materials in M. v. H.83 In that case, two
women, M. and H., lived together in a same-sex relationship. They
had a home and started a business. After ten years, M. left the
common home and sought an order for partition and sale of the
house and, importantly, claimed support. The Supreme Court of
Canada reviewed the relevant Ontario statutory provisions and
extended to same-sex couples in Ontario the right to claim support
upon termination of an intimate relationship.84

81.
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N. E. 2d 941 (Mass.
2003).
82.
See e.g. id. at 952, 967.
83.
M. v. H., 2 S.C.R. 3 (1999) (Supreme Court of Canada).
84.
In M. v. H. intimacy is associated with economic dependence. The
Supreme Court delineated the notion of ―intimacy‖ as follows:
Section 29 [of the Family Law Act, 1986] refers to individuals
who have ―cohabited‖. Section 1(1) . . . defines ―cohabit‖ as ―to
live together in a conjugal relationship, whether within or outside
marriage‖. The accepted characteristics of a conjugal relationship,
as outlined by Cory J. at para. 59, go to the core of what we would
generally refer to as ―intimacy.‖
Id. at para. 99.
Cory, J. states:
Molodowich v. Penttinen (1980), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist.
Ct.), sets out the generally accepted characteristics of a conjugal
relationship. They include shared shelter, sexual and personal
behaviour, services, social activities, economic support and
children, as well as the societal perception of the couple.
However, it was recognized that these elements may be present in
varying degrees and not all are necessary for the relationship to be
found to be conjugal. While it is true that there may not be any
consensus as to the societal perception of same-sex couples, there
is agreement that same-sex couples share many other ―conjugal‖
characteristics. In order to come within the definition, neither
opposite-sex couples nor same-sex couples are required to fit
precisely the traditional marital model to demonstrate that the
relationship is ―conjugal.‖
Id. at para. 59.
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The Court‘s written reasons indicate that sources as diverse as
statistical surveys, behavioral and psychological studies, and law
reform commission reports, were treated as persuasive materials
and listed under the rubric ―Authors Cited,‖ together with
hornbooks, law review articles and sundry doctrinal materials.
Statutes and case-law, that is to say, primary sources in the
common law tradition of Ontario, were separately identified. Some
of these authors-cited sources—helpful but informal, from a
traditional legal viewpoint, yet formal and authoritative in their
respective social science disciplines–must have influenced the
court. By way of example, the court expressly referred to (and
appeared to have critically examined) several studies on the nature
of lesbian relationships.85 Reference to these sources tells us that
some courts are prepared to position social science materials
directly—and not cleansed or filtered through law review articles
and comments—somewhere (and somewhere important) in the
hierarchy of sources. These materials provide some of the best
elements of legal discussions and proceedings relating to intimate

85.
See, e.g., the remarks of Cory and Iacobucci, JJ:
Although there is evidence to suggest that same-sex relationships
are not typically characterized by the same economic and other
inequalities which affect opposite-sex relationships (see, e.g., M.
S. Schneider, "The Relationships of Cohabiting Lesbian and
Heterosexual Couples: A Comparison", Psychology of Women
Quarterly, 10 (1986), at p. 237, and J. M. Lynch and M. E. Reilly,
―Role Relationships: Lesbian Perspectives‖, Journal of
Homosexuality, 12(2) (Winter 1985/86), at pp. 53-54, 66), this
does not, in my mind, explain why the right to apply for support is
limited to heterosexuals.
Id. at para. 110.
See also this statement:
Studies presented to this Court demonstrate that when men are in
such a position, they expect less from their partner in housework:
P. Blumstein and P. Schwartz, American Couples (1983), at p.
151. In other words, the dynamic of dependence also exists for
men in opposite-sex relationships, as a type of "division of labour"
is created, where the man will often assume additional duties at
home while his partner is at work: M. S. Schneider, "The
Relationships of Cohabiting Lesbian and Heterosexual Couples: A
Comparison", Psychology of Women Quarterly, 10 (1986), at p.
234. Other evidence submitted to this Court demonstrate other
forms of dependency that are similarly unique to individuals in
opposite-sex relationships: J. M. Lynch and M. E. Reilly, "Role
Relationships: Lesbian Perspectives", Journal of Homosexuality,
12(2) (Winter 1985/86), at p. 53.
Id. at para. 239.
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relationships.86 Moreover, firsthand accounts,87 interviews,88
personal sentiment,89 polemics,90 and literature91 also usefully
86.
Is the ―law‖ blind to its historical and social contexts? Do legal
actors adequately understand the various factors that influence and fashion their
decisions. Nelken discusses these issues. See generally, David Nelken, Blinding
Insights?–The Limits of a Reflexive Sociology of Law, 25 J. OF L. AND SOCIETY
407 (1998).
87.
See generally KEVIN BOURASSA AND JOE VARNELL, JUST MARRIED–
GAY MARRIAGE AND THE EXPANSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2002). Bourassa‘s and
Varnell‘s chatty personal account of the circumstances surrounding their 2001
marriage in Ontario was published prior to the decision of Halpern v. Attorney
General of Canada, (2003) 65 O.R. (3d) 161; (2003) 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529
(Court of Appeal for Ontario). That decision reformulated the common law
definition of marriage to read: ―the voluntary union for life of two persons to the
exclusion of all others.‖ Id. at para. 156. It also ordered the Province to register
Bourassa‘s and Varnell‘s, together with other parties‘, marriages. Id.
88.
See Cece Cox, To Have and To Hold-Or Not: The Influence of the
Christian Right on Gay Marriage Laws in the Netherlands, Canada, and the
United States, 14 L. & SEX. 1 (2005) at note 39, where Cox refers the reader to
an interview by Kevin Bourassa and Joe Varnell with Kees Waaldijk of Leiden
University. Bourassa and Varnell published the interview on their website:
www.samesexmarriage.ca/advocacy/turin/KeesWaaldijk2002.htm (last visited
Feb. 21, 2011).
89.
See Halpern, supra note 87 at para. 9-12. For example, the Court
reported the following:
Two couples, Kevin Bourassa and Joe Varnell and Elaine and
Anne Vautour, decided to be married in a religious ceremony at
MCCT. In an affidavit, Elaine and Anne Vautour explained their
decision:
We love one another and are happy to be married. We highly
value the love and commitment to our relationship that marriage
implies. Our parents were married for over 40 and 50 years
respectively, and we value the tradition of marriage as seriously as
did our parents.
Id. at para. 12.
90.
For an example of polemical legal writing in France written for
general public, the scholarship of Daniel Borrillo (of the University of Paris X–
Nanterre) is representative. Borrillo argues for (and on behalf of) the gay
community on personal, social and economic issues throughout the European
community. For typical Borrillo thinking, see McAuley, supra note 7 at notes
33-34. The scholarship of Michael Mello of the University of Vermont is a
recent example of American polemical writing reviewing Vermont‘s civil union
legislation and arguing for gay marriage. See generally MICHAEL MELLO,
LEGALIZING GAY MARRIAGE (2004). Mello‘s book has impressive endnotes
drawing on traditional legal materials—law review articles and similar kinds of
scholarship—as well newspaper articles and letters to the editor. Id. at 197–256.
His source materials have been called ―heterodox.‖ See Times Literary
Supplement, May 20, 2005, at 7 (book review).
91.
See generally THE M WORD–WRITERS ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
(KATHY PORIES, ED., 2004). The front flap of this collection of stories and essays
states:
As it heads through the courts, dividing the nation and shaping the
political landscape, the issue of same-sex marriage is becoming
one of the major civil rights battles of our generation. Now, some
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inform courts, again directly or indirectly. They have a place in the
hierarchy of persuasive authority, however horizontal that
hierarchy may appear to be. In fact, the history of privacy and
intimacy is most convincingly illustrated by lively narratives and
spirited monographs on discrete aspects of intimate relationships.92
Once again,93 stories are the stuff of intimate bonds. If marriage is
the institutionalization of the ways that people drink, eat and sleep
together—Boire, manger, coucher ensemble, est mariage, ce me
semble—then narratives of intimacy demonstrate the striking
similarity of many relationships.94
These informal narratives are subsequently formalized. For
example, law reform commissions are usually attentive to
canvassing the citizenry and collecting evidence of popular
opinion, whether at public hearings or on the web.

of the country‘s finest writers, gay and straight, explore the
nuances of one of the most complicated issues of our time.
THE
MCGILL
SHAKESPEARE
MOOT
PROJECT
(www.mcgill.ca/shakespearemoot/) (last visited Feb. 21, 2011), a remarkable
interdisciplinary project, in which the body of legal knowledge consists solely of
the complete works of Shakespeare, has debated same-sex marriage. In the case
of Attorney General of Canada v. Peter Pears, Ben Britten and Others, 2 C. of
Sh. 1 (2004), some of the Court of Shakespeare‘s judgments have been
published. See generally Desmond Manderson and Paul Yachnin, Love on Trial:
Nature, Law, and Same-Sex Marriage in the Court of Shakespeare, 49 MCGILL
L. J. 475 (2004).
92.
See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES–FAMILIES,
INDIVIDUALS, AND THE LAW (2004). Friedman has an admirable blend of
scholarly sources: case-law, law review articles, psychiatry, sociology, statutes,
general books on family law topics, etc., all of which are marshalled, in no
specific hierarchical order, to support his account of modern American family
law issues. Using another approach, the Law Commission of Canada listed the
source materials for its report on adult relationships under headings, e.g.
discussion documents, background research papers, reports, books, journals, and
research studies. The Commission also consulted the reports of other reform
bodies, such as the Australian Law Reform Commission and the law
commissions and institutes of a number of Canadian provinces. See LAW
COMMISSION OF CANADA, BEYOND CONJUGALITY-RECOGNIZING AND
SUPPORTING CLOSE PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS 147-172 (2001).
93.
See supra note 52.
94.
This is Antoine Loisel‘s adage. Loisel was a Paris lawyer whose
Institutes coutumières were published in 1607. See Alain-François Bisson, Sur
un adage trompeur : «En mariage, il trompe qui peut», in LE FAUX EN DROIT
PRIVE 155, 158 (Nicholas Kasirer ed., Les Éditions Thémis, 2000). The adage in
full reads: Boire, manger, coucher ensemble, est mariage, ce me semble: mais il
faut que l‟église y passe. The full text, therefore, speaks to the requirement of a
public ceremony in facie Ecclesiae. Id. at 159. The necessity of a church
ceremony has (totally?) disappeared in the West although, of course, a church
marriage, in some Western systems, may suffice for civil purposes.
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V. INTIMATE ASSOCIATIONS
There are formal incidents and effects arising from the
emotionality and conviviality of couples‘ lives and consequent
upon their sleeping-place. These incidents and effects have been
surveyed for European countries,95 and the findings compared in
five ―dimensions,‖ that is to say, ―the dimensions of marriage,
registered partnership and cohabitation, between different-sex and
same-sex partners, between different areas of private and public
law, between different countries, and between now and previous
years or decades.‖96
This survey clearly illustrates (as do other similar surveys97)
that the number and variety of intimate associations are almost
95.
See generally Kees Waaldijk and others, More or less together:
Levels of legal consequences of marriage, cohabitation and registered
partnership for different-sex and same-sex partners: A comparative study of
nine European countries (Document de travail 125) (Institut National d‘Études
Démographiques, Paris, 2005) (available at http://www.ined.fr) (last visited Feb.
21, 2011). A survey of the incidents and effects of same-sex intimate
relationships in Europe, together with essays and comments on these
relationships, was published in 2004 and used by Waaldijk and his team to
prepare their 2005 findings. See generally Same–sex couples, same-sex
partnerships & homosexual marriages: A focus on cross-national differences
(Document de travail 124) (Marie Digoix & Patrick Festy eds., Institut National
d‘Études Démographiques, Paris, 2004) (available at http://www.ined.fr) (last
visited Feb. 21, 2011).
96.
Waaldijk, supra 95 at 3. Waaldijk and his team‘s survey compared
―levels of legal consequences‖ in private and public law. Comparative analyses
were made for parenting consequences (id. at 12), ―material‖ consequences
(such as allocation and redistribution of property and debts on dissolution of the
relationship, and payment of alimony) (id. at 16), ―positive material‖
consequences in public law (such as lower property and income tax rates, access
to public health insurance, and exemption from inheritance tax) (id. at 20),
―negative material‖ consequences in public law (such as higher property or
income tax rates) (id. at 24), and other consequences (such as residency and
citizenship, testimony in criminal proceedings, and use of surnames) (id. at 28).
The reporters for each of the countries compared the consequences for same and
opposite-sex marriage, registered partnerships, and informal cohabitation on
other discrete topics, e.g. insurance, medically-assisted insemination, workmen‘s
compensation survivorship benefits, organ donations, and the legal duty to have
sexual relations (id. at 58, 60). The templates were structured to compare
marriage, partnership, and informal cohabitation even though Belgium has a
distinct legal regime of rights and benefits for each of de iure and de facto
cohabitation.
97.
See e.g. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, A WHITE PAPER: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE LAW REGARDING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, CIVIL UNIONS, AND
DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS (2004). The report reviews legal developments on the
topics of sexual orientation, gender identity, same-sex marriage, statutory
protections for same-sex couples, and other related issues. The disparate rights
and duties in each state that are attached to same-sex relationships are outlined.
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beyond reckoning. Surveys illustrate that there are numerous and
divergent manners of arrangement of the economic and social
consequences of living-together and vie commune.
Different types of marriage,98 registered or domestic
partnerships or pacts, civil unions, civil partnerships, and countless
modes of de iure and de facto cohabitation exist in the West.99
These associations can occur (or not occur) cumulatively, coextensively, or co-equally.100 Moreover, one-way travel between
co-equal associations, say, from civil union to marriage, is possible
in at least one jurisdiction.101
Id. at 22-29. A casual reader might think that different social and cultural
realities are described whereas the nature of same-sex intimacy is grosso modo
similar from state to state in the United States. The report does not outline every
right and duty. Its authors state: ―Four states provide between sixteen and
several hundred statutory protections and rights to same-sex couples. Ten states
provide benefits to some state employees in same-sex relationships. Several
other states provide between one and a few hundred rights or protections for
same-sex couples, and those rights and protections vary from state to state.‖ Id.
at 22. Courts have taken judicial notice of the benefits of marriage and prepared
lists of statutory benefits. See Goodridge, 798 N. E. 2d at 955-956.
98.
In a single Western system, there can be several kinds of marriage
differentiated by the formalities of solemnization, by the scope of spousal duties
and rights, and by the nature of incidents and effects. See generally 6
HALSBURY‘S LAWS OF INDIA 50.009-50.020 (Butterworths India, New Delhi,
1999). In India, family laws, including marriage and maintenance, are referred
to as personal laws and are sourced in religious laws. See id. at 50.009. Is India
in the West? Its methodology—how it knows and expresses the law—is
manifestly Western.
99.
The divergent relationship models present particular challenges for
private international law. See generally SWISS INSTITUTE OF COMPARATIVE
LAW, ASPECTS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ DES PARTENARIATS
ENREGISTRÉS EN EUROPE–ACTES DE LA XVIE JOURNÉE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ DU 5 MARS 2004 À LAUSANNE (Schulthess, 2004)
(discussing marriage, cohabitation, and partnerships for Germany, Great Britain,
Netherlands, the Nordic countries, Spain, France, Belgium, and Switzerland).
100. The intimate relationships might be cumulative, e.g., a person might
be statutorily recognized as a cohabitant, for Canadian federal purposes, and
recognized as united (the civil union of Quebec) or partnered (the domestic
partnership of Nova Scotia) for provincial rights and benefits. Co-extensively, a
person might be both civilly united (in Quebec) and civilly registered (in the
United Kingdom). Finally, a number of recognized relationships are co-equal,
e.g., the institutions of civil union and marriage both in Quebec and in Vermont.
Yet, this co-equality is not identical in Quebec and Vermont since the
constitutional prerogatives of the province and of the state and their relations
with their respective federal authorities are different.
101. Quebec allows civil union spouses to convert their civil union into
marriage. However, Quebec can only provide for one-way travel. The province
is arguably not constitutionally competent to provide for the conversion of
marriage into a civil union. The conversion will not confer any additional rights
in Quebec private law although it may be advantageous, in a limited number of
cases, for federal entitlements. See An Act to amend the Civil Code as regards
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Intimate associations can exist or co-exist at differing
intensities of social and economic intimacy in a single jurisdiction.
This graduated intimacy, that is to say intimacy measured by
degrees of social and economic functionality, is troubling; yet, it is
no more troubling than the distinct social and economic
consequences of marriage that are now prevalent in the West, e.g.
ownership and management of marital property.
Specific rights and duties attach to all of these relationships.
Some were (and still are) initially available for either homosexuals
or heterosexuals and some are now available for homosexuals and
heterosexuals. Although legal recognition of heterosexual
cohabitation started first and later embraced homosexual
cohabitation, civil unions and domestic partnerships were
conceived in the first instance for gay and lesbian couples.
Sometimes, their conception has been an honest attempt to
introduce a new edifice to house the rights and duties of intimates
between themselves and in their relations with the sovereign.
However, in the United States, civil unions and domestic
partnerships do not seem to have been conceived on the basis of
their intrinsic merits nor imagined as refreshed secular institutions
to complement (or replace) erstwhile civil marriage, now in a high
state of desecularization and resacrementalization. Nor can it be
said that they were conceived for economically symmetrical
relationships, in contrast to the continued asymmetry of
marriage.102 Rather, these unions and partnerships were intended as
legislative comforters for public anxiety, real or imagined, over
gay marriage.
All these institutions compete for the attention of the lawmaker
and vie with the paradigmatic institution of marriage. Yet,
marriage is a confused paradigm. In most of the West, marriage
has been defined as a sui generis secular contract, divorced from
marriage, S.Q. c. 23 (2004) (Quebec). The Explanatory Notes state that this will
allow couples ―to continue their life together as a married couple‖ and that
marriage dissolves the civil union but that the effects of the civil union continue
into the marriage. Is this an upgrade (or a downgrade)? Opinions differ.
102. The life-profile theory of marriage suggests that long-term support
promises protect specific investment by the economically vulnerable spouse. See
generally ANTHONY W. DNES, THE LIFE-PROFILE THEORY OF MARRIAGE,
COHABITATION, AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (MAY 2004) (American Law &
Economics Association 14th Annual Meeting: Working Paper 65). ―Marriage
enables a man and woman to plan their lives and to avoid turning a sexual
asymmetry into the basis for exploitation of the weaker party.‖ Id. at 10-11.
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its former religious and sacramental past.103 It is, therefore, a civil
and purely temporal institution. In this regard, citizens are told that
this is why civil marriage is called civil.104 Despite all this clarity,
its secular nature remains unfathomable to some religious bodies.
Regardless of the secular rhetoric of the civil law, the institution of
marriage has been unable to detach itself from its sacramental
tattoo.
VI. CONCLUSION
Where did we start? Where have we gone? What is law? What
is intimacy? In the good law of today for the people of now, there
is a place for intimacy. There is room for every person‘s sociallytempered autonomy in the choice of an intimate partner. The life of
the citizen is a life of legal travel, with all of its ―mishaps and
disappointments‖ not a life of legal tourism ―cushioned against
misadventure.‖105 Her implication in the law requires that she and
her mate cooperate with the community in which they live and
love, full of both eros and agape,106 and in which they enjoy and
103. Daniel Borrillo briefly addresses the institution of marriage in
France, a country that prizes its secular tradition. See generally, Daniel Borrillo,
Le mariage homosexuel: hommage de l‟hérésie à l‟orthodoxie?, in LA
SEXUALITE A-T-ELLE UN AVENIR? 39-54 (Presses universitaires de France, 1999).
Borrillo points out that the 1791 French constitution clearly states: ―La loi ne
considère le mariage que comme un contrat civil.‖ Id. at 47. For the continued
French interest in its secular tradition, see generally CONSEIL D‘ETAT, RAPPORT
PUBLIC 2004: JURISPRUDENCE ET AVIS DE 2003. UN SIECLE DE LAÏCITE (La
Documentation française, Paris, 2004). For an official affirmation of secular
marriage, see id. at 250, 354-356. In France, clerics are expressly prohibited
under the Code pénal (Criminal Code) from conducting a religious marriage
before a civil marriage has taken place. Id. at 354-355. Yet, notwithstanding its
secular tradition, French courts considered the Roman Catholic moral position
relating to homosexuality as a valid ground for the dismissal of an assistant
sacristan. See D. 30 mars 1990 (Cour d‘appel de Paris) at 596-597 (stating that
the Roman Catholic Church has always strongly condemned homosexuality as
being radically contrary to divine law as this law is embodied in human nature.).
104. The Canadian government took great pains to stress the civil nature
of marriage in its legislation on the topic. See An Act respecting certain aspects
of legal capacity for marriage for civil purposes (Civil Marriage Act) (Bill C-38),
S.C. 2005, chapter 33. See section 2: ―Marriage, for civil purposes, is the lawful
union of two persons to the exclusion of all others.‖
105. See Lawrence Durrell, Reflections on Travel, in SPIRIT OF PLACE:
LETTERS AND ESSAYS ON TRAVEL 423, 426 (Alan G. Thomas, ed., Marlowe&
Company, New York, 1969).
106. For a current statement (restatement?) of the Roman Catholic
position on love (eros, philia, and agape) and its many meanings, see the
Encyclical Letter of Benedict XVI Deus Caritas Est (2005) at para.2-8. The
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exercise their rights as individuals and as intimates. They are rightowners and duty-owers. In recognition of their economic and
social contributions, the community respectfully greets them. The
community is mindful that each of them and all other citizens have
juridical personality, not third-person personality but first-person
self-aware personality. Simone Weil might say that their juridical
personality is their metaxu, that is to say ―those . . . blessings
(home, country, traditions, culture, etc.) which warm and nourish
the soul and without which, short of sainthood, a human life is not
possible.‖107 These metaxu—these blessings—are steppingstones
from the temporal to the spiritual and fullness of being.108
Juridical personality is a way of understanding the private law.
In the civil law tradition, it is the starting-point for all law-talk. By
logical necessity, all legal operations are predicated on knowledge
of the nature and scope of the individual rights and duties at play.
An examination of the content of these rights and duties is
unavoidable when determining the effectiveness of any particular
act or fact.
In the common law tradition, an understanding of juridical
personality is also indispensable for correctly establishing the
boundaries of the private law and for identifying the number and
quality of civil rights. Civil rights are rights that, in and of
themselves, justify private-law operations. They do not seek nor do
they need the endorsement of the public law. They are inherent in
the person and suffice for all juridical acts and facts. These rights
and duties are not constant. Each legal operation individually and
the aggregate of all operations add texture to the assembled
attributes of personality.
In the West, and especially in the common-law West, the
construct of juridical personality is vital for any intelligent
discussion of rights and freedoms.109 It contains the public law to
Letter
is
available
at:
http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/benedictxvi/encyclicals/documents/hfbenxvienc20051225deus-caritas-esten.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2011). All kinds of
love represent ―a single reality, but with different dimensions; at different times,
one or other dimension may emerge more clearly.‖ Id. at para. 8.
107. See Simone Weil, Metaxu, in THE SIMONE WEIL READER 363, 365
(George A. Panichas ed., Moyer Bell, 7th prtg. 1999).
108. See generally id. at 363-365.
109. Juridical personality has always been vital in the civil–law West.
This is tellingly noted by the title of H. Patrick Glenn‘s personal survey of the
world‘s legal traditions. See GLENN, supra note 23. Glenn entitles his chapter on
the civil law: ―A Civil Law Tradition: The Centrality of the Person.‖ Id. at 125-
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its proper sphere of operation, and it provides a proper foundation
for the exercise of rights other than a constitutional foundation. In
the Anglo-American tradition, rights and freedoms are almost
always examined in the context of public law norms formally and
officially issued by the political State. They operate or fail to
operate on grounds related to the interpretation of charters or bills
of rights and other like documents. The merits and demerits of
intimate associations and, in particular, same-sex marriage, have
been debated on constitutional grounds in Canada and the United
States. As a result, the public is cajoled to believe that any
exposition of dignity, autonomy, diversity, intimacy, or privacy is
a top-down development. In fact, rights and duties inevitably take
form bottom-up, from the person to the sovereign. Indeed, they
move from the non-law to the law, and from folkways, to morals
(mores), to law.110
The absence of the conception of juridical personality in the
common law tradition has encouraged an inappropriate expansion
of the public law, fully to the detriment of the private law, and
heightened the positivistic profile of the general law. It has
increased the girth of legislation as lawmakers endeavor to frame
all rights and duties as emanations of sovereign authority and as
special concessions of the state. All of this flies in the face of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
In the public or private law realms of intimate associations, it
seems likely that current ideological quarrels will bear as much
169. He addresses the issue of centrality by referring, on the one hand, to the
Enlightenment thinking with respect to property, with its focus on individual
ownership, and with respect to contract, as the meeting of autonomous wills, and
by referring, on the other hand, to the notions of subjective law and social
equality. Id. at 140-143.
So all the great concepts of western civilization come together
in a kind of package, and at the base is the centrality of the
person, now a rather abstract concept even if seen originally as
a divine representative of the jewish and christian God. And
then, once the theoretical package is in place, you have to look
around and see if it is being applied properly, or whether the
tradition is neglecting someone or something.
Id. at 142-143.
110. On the topic of the relation between non-law (non-droit) and law
(law), see generally JEAN CARBONNIER, FLEXIBLE DROIT: POUR UNE SOCIOLOGIE
DU DROIT SANS RIGUEUR (7th ed., Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence,
Paris, 1992) at 23-48. Carbonnier discusses their hierarchy and chronology.
Does non-law precede law? Which of the two takes first place? Id. at 36-44.
Carbonnier seems inclined to the view that non-law results when law withdraws
and abandons its interest in certain human relations. Id. at 25, 37.
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fruit as ecumenical dialogue, that is to say, none. If this is so, then
more questions should be asked about the role of the law, about
personality, and about a citizen‘s autonomy in her social,
economic, and sexual interactions with and within the community.
Here are some of these questions.
Does the private law need a new civil institution, one that is
truly secular and one that does not interfere with sacramental
conceptions of marriage? Such an institution would not be a civil
union that is more or less co-equal with marriage, but an institution
that would act as an umbrella for all intimate associations and that
would function as the only vessel for the patrimonial relations of
the couple. Why should all intimate relationships be configured on
the marriage model of procreation, paternal authority, monogamy,
indissolubility, and legitimate succession? Should the law not
provide citizens with a new type of close relationship that
recognizes the diversity of economic and sexual profiles?
There are many notions of marriage that make no reference to
procreation. Marriage shares these notions with other intimate
associations. There is friendship. There is the amicitia of intimates,
and this amicitia ―induces people to love one another greatly.‖111
Thus, love and friendship, emotionality, living-together, stability,
mutuality, continuity, reciprocal dependence, reliance, loyalty, and
companionship—all the constituents of fides—are some of the
denominators.
These common characteristics might constitute the skeleton of
a secular consortium—a new institution for intimates and a new
well for their juridical personality.

111. See LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, PART. IV, TIT. XXVII (Samuel Parsons Scott
trans., Robert I. Burns ed., University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001). This
remarkable Title (Concerning the Mutual Obligation Existing Between Men, by
Reason of Friendship) defines and describes amicitia (friendship) in feudal
Spain. The nature of the male amicitia of this Title might well describe the
relationship between Gilgamesh and Enkidu. See supra note †.

